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Abstract
Recent neuroscience models of adolescent brain development attribute the morbidity and mortality of this
period to structural and functional imbalances between more fully developed limbic regions that subserve
reward and emotion as opposed to those that enable cognitive control. We challenge this interpretation of
adolescent development by distinguishing risk-taking that peaks during adolescence (sensation seeking and
impulsive action) from risk taking that declines monotonically from childhood to adulthood (impulsive
choice and other decisions under known risk). Sensation seeking is primarily motivated by exploration of the
environment under ambiguous risk contexts, while impulsive action, which is likely to be maladaptive, is more
characteristic of a subset of youth with weak control over limbic motivation. Risk taking that declines
monotonically from childhood to adulthood occurs primarily under conditions of known risks and reflects
increases in executive function as well as aversion to risk based on increases in gist-based reasoning. We
propose an alternative Lifespan Wisdom Model that highlights the importance of experience gained through
exploration during adolescence. We propose, therefore, that brain models that recognize the adaptive roles
that cognition and experience play during adolescence provide a more complete and helpful picture of this
period of development.
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A B S T R A C T
Recent neuroscience models of adolescent brain development attribute the morbidity and mortality of this
period to structural and functional imbalances between more fully developed limbic regions that subserve re-
ward and emotion as opposed to those that enable cognitive control. We challenge this interpretation of ado-
lescent development by distinguishing risk-taking that peaks during adolescence (sensation seeking and im-
pulsive action) from risk taking that declines monotonically from childhood to adulthood (impulsive choice and
other decisions under known risk). Sensation seeking is primarily motivated by exploration of the environment
under ambiguous risk contexts, while impulsive action, which is likely to be maladaptive, is more characteristic
of a subset of youth with weak control over limbic motivation. Risk taking that declines monotonically from
childhood to adulthood occurs primarily under conditions of known risks and reﬂects increases in executive
function as well as aversion to risk based on increases in gist-based reasoning. We propose an alternative Life-
span Wisdom Model that highlights the importance of experience gained through exploration during adoles-
cence. We propose, therefore, that brain models that recognize the adaptive roles that cognition and experience
play during adolescence provide a more complete and helpful picture of this period of development.
1. Introduction
Recent theorizing and research regarding the neurodevelopment of
the adolescent brain has generated considerable attention in both the
popular media and the scientiﬁc literature. The most striking general-
ization stemming from this work is that the adolescent brain does not
fully mature until at least age 25, with the implication that adolescent
decision-making and judgment is similarly limited up to this age (Casey
et al., 2008; Giedd, 2004; Steinberg, 2008). This conclusion rests on
research indicating that the myelination and pruning of the prefrontal
cortex (PFC) continues into adulthood, well after ventral limbic regions
that control motivation and reward have achieved these milestones. As
a result, it is proposed that adolescents suﬀer from a structural as well
as functional deﬁcit in the ability of the PFC to exert top-down control
over drives that are spurred by the limbic motivational system, leading
to less than “rational” behavior during adolescence. The basic dynamics
of these neurobiological imbalance models are illustrated in Fig. 1
(Casey et al., 2008), showing that limbic structures are activated in
excess of prefrontal cognitive control regions during the adolescent
period.
A key feature of such imbalance models is the suggestion that a
developmental deﬁcit in PFC cognitive control limits adaptive decision
making by adolescents.1 However, when Giedd et al. (1999) ﬁrst pre-
sented evidence of declining PFC gray matter volume in adolescents,
they attributed the phenomenon to the role that experience plays in
sculpting the brain during this developmental period. As they put it, the
decline in PFC gray matter “may herald a critical stage of development
when the environment or activities of the teenager may guide selective
elimination during adolescence.” (p. 863). In other words, gray matter
decline in the PFC could reﬂect pruning that results from the experience
that adolescents gain during this period rather than a direct marker of
increasing behavioral control. As Spear (2010) also noted, pruning may
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be “an example of developmental plasticity whereby the brain is on-
togenetically sculpted on the basis of experience to accommodate en-
vironmental needs.” Needs could vary dramatically across environ-
ments and cultures (Mata et al., 2016), potentially resulting in very
diﬀerent patterns of pruning and brain organization during adolescent
brain development (Choudhury, 2010). For example, evidence has ac-
cumulated to suggest that diﬀerences in socioeconomic status, which
are correlated with cultural inﬂuences, are associated with diﬀerences
in brain structure (Brito and Noble, 2014; Noble et al., 2015). In par-
ticular, Noble et al. (2015) demonstrated that lower socioeconomic
status was associated with diminished cortical surface area and reduced
hippocampal volume even when controlling for maternal education.
Such hippocampal volume reductions have been reported by other
studies as well (Hanson et al., 2011; Hueston et al., 2017). Others have
observed diﬀerences in language-related regions (Piccolo et al., 2016)
and modular brain organization (Krishnadas et al., 2013). Future re-
search should unpack inﬂuences of education, culture, and income
(with concomitant eﬀects on nutrition, access to healthcare, and other
factors that may plausibly aﬀect development) on speciﬁc aspects of
brain development.
Rather than emphasizing the important role of culture and experi-
ence in shaping the development of the brain, researchers have instead
focused on excess levels of maladaptive risk behavior, such as injury,
drug use, pregnancy, and other unhealthy outcomes, as support for
imbalance (Dahl, 2004; Steinberg, 2008; Casey, 2015). However, the
stereotype of the impulsive, emotional, and distraught adolescent rests
much more on the rise in adverse outcomes during this age period than
on their overall prevalence (Institute of Medicine, 2011; Rivers et al.,
2008). For the vast majority of adolescents, this period of development
passes without substance dependence, sexually transmitted infection,
pregnancy, homicide, depression, suicide, or death due to car crashes
(Institute of Medicine, 2011; Willoughby et al., 2013). Indeed, the risks
of these outcomes are often comorbid with each other (Biglan and
Cody, 2003; Kreuger et al., 2002), leaving the average adolescent
without great risk of life-altering consequences.
We do not question the reality that the adolescent period entails
risk. What we challenge is the interpretation of the brain and behavioral
underpinnings of this risk. Research suggests that the brain is structured
to enhance development by encouraging movement toward in-
dependence and self-suﬃciency, a process that supports exploration
and learning (Luna and Wright, 2015; Murty et al., 2016; Spear, 2013).
Support for this view has been observed in both humans and other
animals following the onset of puberty. Nevertheless, a focus on adverse
outcomes leaves us with a biased picture that limits our ability to
identify adaptive features of adolescent brain development within the
context of the entire lifespan. Instead, we argue for a more nuanced
interpretation of risk taking and its implications for healthy develop-
ment. In particular, we outline the evidence regarding the role of sen-
sation seeking, which although it peaks during adolescence does not
reﬂect imbalance, as opposed to forms of impulsivity which either do
not peak or only characterize a subset of youth. Our review of research
regarding structural development indicates that the relation between
brain structure and risk taking has failed to consider the implications of
diﬀerent forms of risk taking. Our analysis suggests that stereotypes of
adolescents as particularly susceptible to unhealthy risk taking sim-
pliﬁes how adolescents think about risk and ignores the important role
that experience plays in more adaptive forms of risk taking (Reyna
et al., 2015a; Romer, 2010). In what follows, we consider what a
broader perspective on adolescent brain development would suggest,
how that helps to explain the way adolescents make decisions, and how
these decisions can be improved.
1.1. The rise in sensation seeking
Consistent with stereotypes of young people, adolescents exhibit
heightened attraction to novel and exciting experiences despite their
evident risk (Chambers et al., 2003; Romer and Hennessy, 2007; Spear,
2010). This tendency, known as sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 2007),
rises rapidly during adolescence. As seen in Fig. 2, a nationally re-
presentative U.S. survey of 1800 youth indicates that sensation seeking
peaks around age 19 in males and 16 in females. A similar pattern has
been observed across a wide range of countries (Duell et al., 2016). This
rather striking pattern is regarded as a marker of rising dopaminergic
activation during adolescence (Chambers et al., 2003; Wahlstrom et al.,
2010) and may reﬂect activity in the midbrain dopamine pathway as-
cending from the ventral tegmental region (Ikemoto, 2007; Previc,
2009). This pathway traverses through the ventral striatum before
branching into the orbital and ventromedial frontal cortex. These re-
gions are heavily involved in recognition and anticipation of reward
(Pagnoni et al., 2002; Schultz et al., 1997) and thus suggest a biological
basis for increased attraction to novel and exciting experience during
adolescence that declines as the brain transitions to adulthood (see
Wahlstrom et al., 2010 for a review of evidence linking a peak in ex-
ploratory behavior during adolescence with changes in dopamine ex-
pression over the lifespan). A related personality cluster known as the
behavioral activation system (BAS) is also believed to be related to
Fig. 1. Casey et al. (2008) model of imbalance between prefrontal versus limbic control
over behavior in adolescence.
With permission from Institute of Medicine (2011, p. 38).
Fig. 2. Trends in sensation seeking by gender in a national U. S. sample.
With permission from Romer (2010).
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dopamine function (Carver and White, 1994). One of the indicators of
the BAS known as fun seeking is highly related to sensation seeking,
while two other related indicators (reward responsiveness and drive)
may be more associated with achievement motivations (Romer et al.,
2016).
What is often neglected in discussion of imbalance is a rise in do-
pamine activity in dorsal and medial PFC (Meng et al., 1999; Weickert
et al., 2007) fed by another pathway originating primarily in the sub-
stantia nigra that ascends through dorsal striatum into dorsal PFC and
parietal cortex, regions that control movement and higher order deci-
sion making (Ikemoto, 2007; Previc, 2009). Dopamine neurons in this
pathway appear to serve more global salience and cognitive processing
functions than the ventral route (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Roeper,
2013). This pathway enables the adolescent brain to exert greater at-
tention and other executive functions that are important abilities for
reasoning and complex decision-making (Cools et al., 2008; Cools and
Robbins, 2004). In particular, dopamine is critical for the maintenance
of activity in working memory (WM) (Arnsten et al., 2012; D’Esposito
and Postle, 2015), a function centered in frontoparietal cortex that is
critical for recruiting experience-based information during decision
making (Fuster, 2009; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Shamosh et al., 2008).
However, dopamine activation in the dorsal striatum has also been
linked to various cognitive functions, including cognitive control and
episodic memory (Bäckman et al., 2000; Bäckman et al., 2006; Volkow
et al., 1998). Furthermore, as we describe below, both structural and
functional dopamine activity in the striatum and PFC declines starting
in the third decade of life with associated declines in these cognitive
functions. Thus, the rise in dopaminergic activity that may underlie
sensation seeking is also accompanied by increased dopaminergic ac-
tivity in corticostriatal pathways that support the ability to exert con-
trol over rewarding experience and to learn from it (Murty et al., 2016;
Whalstrom et al., 2010).
1.2. Brain development and adolescent self control
Emphasis on the reward-related functions of dopamine has re-
inforced a focus on impulsive behavior during adolescence. However, if
the adolescent brain undergoes development in both ventral motiva-
tional and dorsal cognitive capacities, then the hypothesis of structural
and functional imbalance as a normative developmental pattern needs
reconsideration. Indeed, contrary to structural imbalance models of
brain development, individual diﬀerences in sensation seeking (and
associated risk taking) have been found to be positively correlated with
WM and other indicators of executive function (Raine et al., 2002;
Romer et al., 2011; Zuckerman, 2007). In one longitudinal study
(Romer et al., 2011), individual diﬀerences in WM predicted sub-
sequent levels of sensation seeking even after controlling for age, sug-
gesting that sensation-based risk taking rises in concert with executive
function. Indeed, executive function rises rapidly during adolescence
(as does sensation seeking) and asymptotes well before age 25 (Gur
et al., 2012; Luciana et al., 2005; Luna et al., 2004; Williams et al.,
1999). Thus, the rise in dopamine expression during adolescence may
play a role in both sensation seeking and executive function.
Recent models of dopamine expression in mice and rats suggest that
dopamine neurons become active in ventral and dorsal striatum prior to
their emergence in medial PFC (mPFC) (Naniex et al., 2012; Reynolds
et al., 2017). Indeed, dopamine pathways between orbitofrontal PFC
and the striatum are in place prior to adolescence in humans (Fareri
et al., 2015). The growth of dopaminergic connections between the
striatum and mPFC is associated with improvements in cognitive
functions related to value learning (Naniex et al., 2012; Reynolds et al.,
2017). However, these gaps are eliminated by early adulthood, perhaps
mirroring what happens in humans. As dopamine function in the mPFC
grows during adolescence, there is also evidence that activation in the
dorsal striatum is weaker than in the ventral region, a pattern that may
have the adaptive function of enhancing exploration and action-
outcome learning (Matthews et al., 2013). Nevertheless, many im-
portant cognitive functions that are subserved by the dorsal striatum
and its connection with ventral PFC are in place prior to adolescence,
and consistent with the development of cognitive control in humans,
dopaminergic control over cognitive ability centered in the mPFC ap-
pears to be available by early adulthood.
In view of the rise in both limbic and prefrontal dopamine expres-
sion during adolescence, the generalization that adolescents lack cog-
nitive control relative to limbic activation may have been overstated, a
conclusion also reached by Crone and Dahl (2012). Following their
review of imaging studies of functional brain development, they found
no pattern of brain activation that consistently distinguished adolescent
from adult performance in cognitive control tasks: Some cognitive
control tasks elicited higher activation in adolescents versus adults,
whereas other tasks elicited lower activation. As seen in Fig. 3, by ages
16 and 17, the variability in executive control as assessed in a go-no
task is already so large that many adolescents in that age range perform
at a level that is equal to that of adults. Although early adolescents
perform below the average level of adults in go/no-go and similar tasks,
most late adolescents are either equal to or better than the average
adult (Williams et al., 1999).
Similarly, in one of the largest imaging studies of executive function
in youth ages 8–22, Satterthwaite et al. (2013a) found that diﬀerences
attributable to age were much smaller than individual diﬀerences in
performance on an N-back WM task (see Fig. 4). Although WM im-
proved with age, individual diﬀerences were large, with many late
adolescents exhibiting better WM performance than the average young
adult. Furthermore, brain scans demonstrated that WM performance
was correlated with enhanced activation in PFC executive regions along
with reduced activation of the default mode, which includes limbic
cortex (Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle and Gusnard, 2005). Thus, while
WM and executive function do improve with age in the aggregate, in-
dividual diﬀerences are large, such that many late adolescents are as
capable as adults at recruiting performance-relevant activation of the
executive system and deactivation of default mode regions.
1.3. Sensation seeking vs. impulsivity in adolescent development
A major contention of imbalance models is that adolescents are
more subject to poor impulse control than either children or adults. For
example, Casey (2015, page 299) notes that imbalance is “presumably
not observed in childhood because there is a relative lack of maturity
across and between regions within the (corticosubcortical) circuit, and
in adults, there is a relative maturity of the underlying neurocircuitry.”
Fig. 3. Data illustrating development of cognitive control during adolescence and early
adulthood.
With permission from Casey and Caudle (2013).
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However, in drawing this conclusion one must distinguish between
sensation seeking, which does not appear to reﬂect imbalance, and
impulsivity, which is a form of decision-making that is overly sensitive
to immediate urges without adequate consideration of consequences.
There are at least two forms of impulsivity that are relevant in regard to
adolescent behavior (Winstanley et al., 2010). One called impulsive
action reﬂects tendencies to act without thinking about consequences,
also known as motor impulsivity (Patton et al., 1995; Romer et al.,
2009). Acting without thinking is moderately positively related to
sensation seeking, as well as the BAS and, also peaks during adoles-
cence (Collado et al., 2014; Kasen et al., 2011; Shulman et al., 2015). A
major diﬀerence between acting without thinking and sensation
seeking is that, unlike sensation seeking, it is inversely related to WM
ability (Khurana et al., 2012; Romer et al., 2011). This inverse re-
lationship is understandable in that persons with this form of im-
pulsivity lack the attentional control and capacity to consider alter-
natives to strong impulses.
Another form of impulsivity, known as impulsive choice (e.g.,
Mischel et al., 1989; Romer et al., 2010), reﬂects tendencies to choose
smaller, immediate rewards over larger but delayed rewards (McClure
et al., 2004; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). This preference for im-
mediate reward is also inversely related to WM ability (Shamosh et al.,
2008), again suggesting that weak ability to consider alternative
courses of action predisposes to this form of impulsivity. Nevertheless,
it is largely unrelated to sensation seeking (Cyders and Coskunpinar,
2011), which is not surprising given that it involves a choice between
two rewards. Although it correlates with impulsive action, it does not
exhibit a peak during adolescence. Rather it declines slowly from
childhood onward, reﬂecting the increase in executive function during
adolescence (Green et al., 1994; Romer et al., 2010; Steinberg et al.,
2009; van den Bos et al., 2015). Thus, it is a simpliﬁcation to assert that
the adolescent period is marked by heightened impulsivity relative to
children and adults considering that impulsive choice does not peak
during this age period.
Although impulsive action and sensation seeking appear to conform
to the stereotype of the impulsive adolescent, sensation seeking has
diﬀerent consequences from impulsive action. Research in both humans
and other animals indicates that sensation seeking is positively corre-
lated with PFC activation, while impulsivity displays the opposite ten-
dency (Jupp and Dalley, 2014). Youth with high sensation seeking
tendencies gravitate toward potentially risky activities, but in the ab-
sence of acting without thinking, they are less likely to experience
adverse health consequences, such as addiction or problem gambling,
than youth with impulsive tendencies (Khurana et al., 2017; Magid
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2007). These ﬁndings have remarkable par-
allels in the animal literature where it has been found that sensation-
seeking lab rats are likely to try addictive drugs, but they are not likely
to continue their use when it leads to adverse consequences (Belin et al.,
2008; Winstanley et al., 2010). In contrast, rats that act impulsively are
much more likely to develop addictive behavior that persists despite the
maladaptive consequences. Lack of cognitive control, therefore, is more
clearly characterized by impulsive action than sensation seeking.
Bjork and Pardini (2015) review the evidence regarding develop-
mental changes in brain response to rewarding stimuli. Their review
suggests that youth who exhibit harmful risk-taking tendencies exhibit
brain responses consistent with weak cognitive control. However, this
pattern is only representative of a subset of youth. Impulsive youth who
lack self-control have been observed to display this characteristic at a
young age and to continue to display poor control over behavior well
into adulthood (Iacono et al., 2008; Moﬃtt et al., 2011; Reyna, 2012).
Indeed, such youth are disproportionately likely to experience the ha-
zards that arise during adolescence and beyond, as examples, higher
rates of injuries and illnesses due to automotive crashes, violence, and
sexually transmitted infections (Moﬃtt et al., 2011; Sourander et al.,
2006). Nevertheless, it is important for both theoretical and pragmatic
reasons to distinguish risk taking that arises due to interest in exploring
the environment from a developmental deﬁcit in cognitive control
during the adolescent period.
We have observed the beginnings of the distinction between ex-
ploratory and impulsive risk taking in a longitudinal cohort one of us is
studying in Philadelphia (Romer et al., 2009). Youth ages 13–15 who
began to use drugs with increasing frequency were much more likely to
be highly impulsive than sensation seeking. Sensation seekers at this
age try drugs, but they do not typically exhibit progression in regular
use (Khurana et al., 2015a). A similar pattern was observed for early
sexual initiation (Khurana et al., 2012) and unprotected sex (Khurana
et al., 2015b). Although high sensation seekers may explore novel be-
havior that can lead to harmful outcomes if continued, they appear to
learn from these experiences as they age, while youth with impulse
control problems do not. These patterns suggest that the increase in
sensation seeking that characterizes adolescence does not necessarily
lead to maladaptive behavior unless it is accompanied by weak ex-
ecutive function, such as exhibited by acting without thinking or the
desire for immediate reward.
Fig. 4. Data from Satterthwaite et al. (2013 with permission) illus-
trating the rise in WM ability from ages 8 to 22 that is overshadowed
by individual diﬀerences. Panel A illustrates the stimuli used to assess
diﬀerent degrees of challenge to working memory. B and C show the
increasing diﬃculty of the task as reﬂected in behavior. D shows the
overall performance as measured with d’. Red points refer to females
and blue to males.
D. Romer et al. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience 27 (2017) 19–34
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As suggested by Reyna and Farley (2006), there appear to be two
divergent routes to heightened adolescent risk taking: one that is as-
sociated with a greater reliance on executive resources (energized by a
greater drive toward sensation seeking) and one that is associated with
reduced executive capability (impulsivity) (see also Chassin et al., 1989;
Reyna et al., 2015b). Despite the dominant narrative that adolescents
are impulsive, Reyna and Farley’s (2006) overview of the literature
suggests that much of adolescents’ risk taking is characterized by a
surprising “rationality” in the conventional economic sense (Institute of
Medicine, 2011). That is, risk taking across many real-world domains is
found to be a function of trade-oﬀs between perceived risks and ben-
eﬁts—as contrasted with impulsive or emotional risk taking. If any-
thing, many adolescents can be described as “hyper-rational,” inasmuch
as they rely on the risks and beneﬁts of their behavior even more than
adults do, which promotes risk taking when negative consequences are
perceived to be unlikely (as is the case with many public health threats,
such as contracting HIV).
Brain models that emphasize imbalanced development of limbic
versus cognitive control regions suggest that adolescents are resistant to
information about risks. Because the imbalance is “hard-wired,” there is
little one can do other than to shield adolescents from their otherwise
natural risk tendencies (Steinberg, 2008, 2014). However, trends in the
use of both legal and illegal drugs, as assessed since 1975 by the
Monitoring the Future (MTF) study (Johnston et al., 2015a), indicate
that adolescents are responsive to the harm that drugs can pose. These
harms are transmitted through various channels, including media
campaigns (Elder et al., 2004), school-based education (Faggiano et al.,
2008), and parental and peer inﬂuences (Bahr et al., 2005). Indeed, use
of popular substances such as tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana have
declined since the survey began. Furthermore, the correlation in the
MTF study between annual rates of use of these drugs and perceptions
of risk associated with those drugs was r =−0.83 for alcohol,
r =−0.63 for marijuana, and r =−0.80 for cigarettes. These patterns
are suggestive of an adolescent brain that is sensitive to adverse con-
sequences despite interest in exploring novel experiences. Contrary to
stereotypes about adolescents, Reyna and Farley’s (2006) overview of
the literature showed that much adolescent risk taking was consistent
with sensitivity to both perceived risks and beneﬁts, which is a rational
rather than impulsive process according to traditional views of ration-
ality.
1.4. The importance of type of risk
Research concerning the imbalanced adolescent brain has taken a
rather broad brush approach to the assessment of risk taking. In this
section, we review what is known about developmental trends in risk
taking as assessed in laboratory tasks and how diﬀerent forms of risk
taking are related to cognitive control. As previously noted, despite
stereotypes of adolescents as more impulsive than either children or
adults, there is considerable evidence that some risk-taking preferences
(such as impulsive choice) do not peak during adolescence but instead
follow a monotonic decline from childhood to adulthood. A develop-
mental decline in risk taking is common in tasks in which the gains and
losses attributable to diﬀerent choices are explicitly deﬁned or able to
be learned quickly (Defoe et al., 2015). This kind of task, known as
decision under risk, is diﬀerent from ones in which the outcomes and
associated probabilities are ambiguous or unknown, commonly known
as decisions under ambiguity (Brand et al., 2006; Volz and Gigerenzer,
2012).
Assessments of impulsive choice fall under the rubric of decision
under risk in that these paradigms explicitly provide information re-
garding the magnitude of reward and the likelihood of its occurrence as
denominated by either delay or probability. Other tests of decision
under risk provide choices between two or more alternative options
that diﬀer in reward and probability of outcome. A common task is one
in which a certain positive option is contrasted with a riskier option
even though the expected value of the risky option is equivalent to the
certain option (e.g., win $2 for sure vs. equal chance to win nothing or
$4) (see Levin and Hart, 2003). These tests also demonstrate a mono-
tonic decline in risk taking in which children are more risk seeking than
adolescents who are more risk seeking than adults. When diﬀerent age
groups are compared on other types of choice tasks in which a certain
option is not available, the same decline is evident once IQ is held
constant (Defoe et al., 2015). This control is important because it is
diﬃcult to arrange choice tasks that are understandable for children
(e.g., under age 10; see also Reyna and Ellis, 1994).
Like Levin and Hart (2003) and Reyna and Ellis (1994), Paulsen
et al. (2011, 2012) designed a task that was easily comprehended from
childhood to young adulthood and found clear evidence for a decline in
risk seeking whether a certain option was available or not. One ex-
planation for this clear deviation from imbalance models as well as
stereotypes of adolescent impulsivity is that adolescents are more risk
seeking under ambiguity than children or adults (Paulsen et al., 2012).
That is, given the potential for a reward but lack of information about
its likelihood, adolescents will be more inclined to explore the risky
option than either children or adults. As a result, they may actually
exhibit a more rational response than adults who are notoriously risk
averse when certain rewards are at risk.
In a demonstration of adolescent exploration, Tymula et al. (2012)
showed that compared to adults, adolescents are more likely than
adults to take risks that are ambiguous. As a result, their behavior was
more “rational” in the economic sense of evaluating options based on
expected value than adults. In their study, adults were so averse to
unknown risks that they preferred expected values that were far smaller
than adolescents were willing to tolerate. As they conjectured, “such a
tolerance may make sense, because it would allow young organisms to
take better advantage of learning opportunities.” Adolescents’ greater
tolerance for ambiguity may also reﬂect their overly optimistic eva-
luation of the rewards of novel behavior (Romer, 2010; Romer and
Hennessy, 2007). Exploration of novel environments has survival value
and has been linked to activity in both PFC and subcortical regions
(Daw et al., 2006), again suggesting that adolescents may not be
structurally handicapped with respect to speciﬁc information-proces-
sing abilities that facilitate learning.
The evidence we have reviewed suggests that in characterizing
adolescent risk taking, it is critical to distinguish between diﬀerent
types of risk behavior, each of which has unique motivational and
cognitive underpinnings. We describe these diﬀerent patterns in Fig. 5.
Impulsive action is characterized by insensitivity to risk, a form of risk
taking that peaks during early adolescence. However, it is only char-
acteristic of a subgroup of youth with weak executive function and self-
control, conditions that are present prior to adolescence (Bjork and
Pardini, 2015; Kreuger et al., 2002; Moﬃtt et al., 2011). This form of
risk taking is most clearly associated with the behavior that imbalance
models seek to explain. In the absence of intervention, this form of
imbalance can persist into adulthood. Impulsive choice as well as other
forms of decision making under known risk do not peak during ado-
lescence. Indeed, adolescents are more inclined to avoid risks than
children under delay of reward or other forms of decision making under
known risk. Finally, choice under ambiguity is sensitive to sensation
seeking tendencies that encourage exploration, such as use of drugs
(Romer and Hennessy, 2007). Although it may peak during adoles-
cence, exploration and tolerance of ambiguity is not devoid of cognitive
control and may actually be more adaptive in many circumstances than
the extreme ambiguity avoidance exhibited by adults.
1.5. Do adolescent risk taking tendencies match predictions of imbalance?
If developmental imbalance between cognitive control and limbic
activation were responsible for peaks in adolescent risk taking, one
would expect those peaks to occur in mid-adolescence when imbalance
is at its height (Willoughby et al., 2013). However, to the degree
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adolescents suﬀer injury, the period of highest risk occurs rather late in
the transition to adulthood when inexperience is still high despite the
nearly complete maturation of brain networks that are thought to en-
able cognitive control. For example, use of either cigarettes or mar-
ijuana peaks around age 20 in the U.S. (Romer, 2010); while binge
drinking remains high throughout the third decade (Johnston et al.,
2015b). Deaths due to overdoses of alcohol peak much later, around
age 50 (Kanny et al., 2015), although younger drinkers may be more
likely to overdose and survive. The proportion of driving fatalities at-
tributable to alcohol peaks between ages 21 to 34 and continues at high
rates until age 54 (US Census Bureau, 2012). Sexually transmitted in-
fections such as gonorrhea and chlamydia peak between ages 20 to 24
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014).
Conclusions about age trends in risk-taking must take risk oppor-
tunity and other co-occurring factors into account, as Shulman et al.
(2016) note. In particular, research has shown that adult supervision of
adolescents declines as they age, especially in males, thereby providing
increasing opportunity to take risks (Gerard et al., 2008). However,
with sensation seeking on the decline and cognitive control at its peak
during early adulthood, any increases in unhealthy risk taking during
this period would seem less attributable to imbalance than to stable
individual diﬀerences in impulsivity that emerge prior to adolescence
and remain evident into adulthood (Iacono et al., 2008; Moﬃtt et al.,
2011). As adolescents enter young adulthood, they are presented with
even greater risk-taking opportunities that will challenge those with
weak cognitive control.
In summary, the appeal of the imbalance model rests in part on the
popular stereotype of the adolescent as impulsive and lacking in cog-
nitive control. Closer examination of this stereotype reveals that only
one form of impulsivity (acting without thinking) peaks during ado-
lescence and that this form of impulsivity varies signiﬁcantly across
individuals. The other major form of impulsivity, impulsive choice,
declines from childhood to adulthood and thus is not likely to be ex-
plained by peaks in adolescent imbalance. In addition, other decisions
under conditions of known risk also decline from childhood to adult-
hood. Finally, although sensation seeking does peak during adoles-
cence, it is not characterized by the absence of cognitive control.
1.6. Evidence for structural imbalance
If imbalance does not characterize all types of risk taking behavior,
what is the evidence regarding structural imbalance in brain
development? Studies of brain structure and risk taking tend to produce
confusing results, which is not surprising given that risk taking itself is a
complex behavior. Some forms of risk taking can be positively related to
executive function (e.g., decision under ambiguity) and others inversely
related (e.g., impulsive action).
In normal development, gray matter loss in PFC is thought to be a
marker of maturation, perhaps reﬂecting ﬁne-tuning of brain structure
(Spear, 2010). However, research examining structural brain develop-
ment in relation to executive control has found that less prefrontal gray
matter is associated with ADHD and forms of impulsivity that emerge
early in development (Shaw et al., 2011; van Ewijk et al., 2012). Such
persons also exhibit a lower rate of gray matter reduction as they age.
With thinner cortical gray matter at the outset of adolescence, there
may be less to prune. Thus, simple indices of gray matter reduction are
unlikely to be a pure marker of enhanced cognitive control. Indeed, the
development of brain structure varies with IQ in a complex interaction
with age. Shaw et al. (2006) demonstrated that higher IQ is associated
with thinner cortex in childhood, while in adolescents this relationship
is reversed and thicker cortex is associated with higher IQ. A more re-
cent longitudinal study of 504 participants corroborated this interaction
with age, but suggested that the transition point may occur in early
adulthood (age 21) rather than adolescence (Schnack et al., 2015).
Recent research suggests that patterns of gray matter change are
location dependent and underlines the importance of white matter
expansion occurring as a result of myelination. Vandekar et al. (2015)
recently showed that gray matter reduction was maximal in sulci where
white matter organization occurred. Multivariate analyses also revealed
a second pattern, whereby gyral cortex thickened in early adolescence,
a process that appears to asymptote by age 13. Thus, while this ﬁnding
awaits replication in longitudinal studies, human neuroimaging re-
search indicates that cortical thinning may be the result of both myeli-
nation and pruning, while cortical thickening characterizes a secondary
maturation pattern that occurs during adolescence in more localized
parts of gyral cortex. These more complex patterns of gray matter
change further suggest that indices based on overall gray matter change
are likely to obscure more complex organizational changes in brain
structure as adolescents age. Indeed, it appears that the dominant
pattern of brain development from childhood to adulthood is mono-
tonic decline in gray matter associated with increases in myelination
(Lebel et al., 2012). However, Berns et al. (2009) found that controlling
for age, white matter maturation was positively related to a wide range
of prior real-world risk behavior in adolescents, some of which may
Fig. 5. Diﬀerences in three types of risk taking ten-
dencies across age. Trends for Known and
Ambiguous risks apply to all adolescents while the
trend for Insensitive risk taking applies to youth with
high levels of acting without thinking that precede
adolescence and remain elevated into adulthood.
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well be associated with exploratory drives. This pattern was recently
replicated in an experimental context by Kwon et al. (2015). Never-
theless, other research ﬁnds that white matter integrity in some brain
regions is weaker in children with ADHD, suggesting that some white
matter deﬁcits play a role in youth with this form of impulsivity (van
Ewijk et al., 2012). In sum, there does not appear to be a simple relation
between myelination and risky behavior. Developmental diﬀerences in
myelination can be associated with greater rather than less risky beha-
vior during adolescence, especially when the risks are ambiguous. On
the other hand, conditions such as ADHD which are likely to reﬂect
impulse control problems may be characterized by less white matter
development.
Analyses of gray matter maturation in limbic regions also fail to
conform to expectations of structural imbalance. Rather than reﬂecting
early maturation in limbic structures, gray matter change continues
well into adolescence (Dennison et al., 2013; Raznahan et al., 2014). A
direct test of the structural imbalance model conducted by Mills et al.
(2014) examined diﬀerential brain maturation in a longitudinal study
of volume changes in the PFC versus the amygdala and the nucleus
accumbens. Using three scans across childhood, adolescence, and young
adulthood, these researchers found that the amygdala exhibited in-
creased volume up to about age 16, when growth in this structure began
to asymptote. The accumbens exhibited declining volume as adoles-
cents aged. Using these limbic regions as indicators of imbalance in
relation to maturation of the PFC, the researchers correlated individual
diﬀerences in structural imbalance with reports of real-world risk
taking. Consistent with the possibility that the risk taking recalled by
those participants was a mixture of exploratory and impulsive behavior,
there was no correlation between the imbalance observed in brain
structure and reports of risk behavior during adolescence. Notwith-
standing the study’s sample size (n = 33), the authors “failed to ﬁnd a
relationship between the presence of a mismatch in brain maturation
and risk-taking and sensation-seeking behaviors during adolescence.”
(p. 147).
The imbalance model advanced by Galván et al. (2006) suggested
that ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) matures more slowly than the ventral
striatum and that greater activation in the striatum relative to vmPFC
could be the source of greater risk taking in adolescents. This model
does not seem to follow from the original observation that brain ma-
turation during adolescence proceeds from ventral to dorsal regions.
Indeed, a recent study examining resting state connectivity between the
striatum and ventral- and medial-PFC found that these regions ex-
hibited early and rather stable connectivity from childhood to adult-
hood (Fareri et al., 2015).
It is important to note that Galván et al. (2006) based their con-
clusions on a reward learning paradigm in which adolescents have been
shown to exhibit greater ventral striatal response to reward prediction
errors than adults (see also Section 2.2 of this issue later in regard to
Cohen et al., 2010). Thus, this heightened striatal response may not be a
particularly sensitive indicator of maladaptive risk taking. Furthermore,
as participants gained experience in the task, adolescents also showed
an anticipatory vmPFC response suggesting that this region “predicted”
the outcome of the reward cue, an ability that is associated with healthy
vmPFC function (Rolls, 2014). Thus, if anything, this study showed
greater functional synchrony between these regions in adolescents than
in either children or adults, a ﬁnding potentially indicative of greater
sensitivity to reward learning. A follow-up study by Galván et al. (2007)
found that heightened ventral striatal activation in receipt of reward
was a predictor of the likelihood of engaging in hypothetical real-world
risk-taking; however, this was an individual diﬀerence, characteristic of
both adults and adolescents.
Christakou et al. (2011) found that activation in vmPFC and con-
nectivity with ventral striatum was related to age-dependent decline in
impulsive choice. Consistent with the cognitive control predictions of
imbalance models, but not the reward sensitivity predictions, this form
of risk taking did not peak during adolescence. Thus, this study did not
directly address the conditions underlying adolescent-speciﬁc im-
balance.
In total, the ﬁndings suggest that white matter development and
associated declines in gray matter are not clearly related to reduced
risky behavior. Furthermore, connectivity between the striatum and
vmPFC is established early in development such that adolescents need
not be handicapped by inadequate linkage between these regions.
Indeed, the evidence appears to be more consistent with the important
role of the vmPFC in reward-based learning during adolescence, and the
close connectivity between this region and the ventral striatum (Haber
and Knutson, 2010; Rolls, 2014).
1.7. Other models of risky decision making
Other models of risky decision making also focus on the relative
strength of cognitive control and reward sensitivity processes (Casey,
2015). However, these models do not require a structural deﬁcit in the
ability to exercise self-control. For example, McClure et al. (2004) ﬁnd
that within the same individuals, making less impulsive choices is as-
sociated with greater activity in PFC cognitive control regions, while
during the same scanning session making impulsive choices is asso-
ciated with ventral striatal activation. Nevertheless, in a recent devel-
opmentally sensitive study across ages 8–25, van den Bos et al. (2015)
found that functional connectivity between medial striatum and cog-
nitive control regions (dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC) mediated
declines in impulsive choice across age. However, as has been observed
in other research (Green et al., 1994; Romer et al., 2010; Steinberg
et al., 2009), discount rates declined rapidly from childhood to early
adolescence and showed very little decline from that point onward.
Thus, apart from individual diﬀerences, impatience may not be parti-
cularly relevant for understanding adolescent peaks in maladaptive
adolescent risk taking. In addition, connectivity change was observed
with the medial rather than ventral striatum, suggesting greater in-
volvement with cognitive control than motivational functions of the
striatum (Cools et al., 2008), a result consistent with the ﬁnding that
sensation seeking and discounting are largely uncorrelated (Cyders and
Coskunpinar, 2011; Romer et al., 2010).
The model of hot versus cold cognition proposed by Metcalfe and
Mischel (1999) proposes that reducing the appeal of immediate (hot)
rewards can be accomplished by ﬂexible allocation of attention (e.g.,
thinking about something other than the reward). This model also fo-
cuses on the ability to delay gratiﬁcation, a form of impulsive choice
that does not peak during adolescence. Although the ability to allocate
attention may increase with development, it is not a skill that is par-
ticularly impaired in adolescence relative to earlier ages, and variation
in tendencies to delay gratiﬁcation may well be driven by individual
diﬀerences in life experience (McGuire and Kable, 2013).
The Driven Dual Systems model proposed by Luna and Wright
(2015) also focuses on imbalance between cognitive control and do-
pamine driven reward motivation. Unlike the Casey model in Fig. 1,
their model recognizes that cognitive control achieves adult levels by
mid-adolescence. However, they suggest that the rise in dopamine ac-
tivation during adolescence exceeds the levels experienced by adults,
thereby predisposing toward immediate rewards in excess of adult le-
vels. Nevertheless, Luna and Wright suggest that the sensation seeking
that results from this imbalance has adaptive characteristics, such as the
need to explore the environment. They also note that this imbalance
“may make some adolescents vulnerable to risk-taking behavior’ (p.
107). Luna and Wright use the term risk-taking to characterize mala-
daptive behavior by deﬁnition; but as we have noted, exploration is a
form of risk-taking that need not be maladaptive. Thus, their model is
consistent with our suggestion that the rise in maladaptive risk taking
only characterizes some adolescents and thus accords with the analysis
presented here.
Another model that has garnered signiﬁcant attention in regard to
adolescent brain development is the Triadic Model of Ernst and
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colleagues (Ernst, 2014; Ernst and Fudge, 2009). This model is de-
scribed by Ernst (2014) as a ‘heuristic tool’ for organizing neuroscience
research on motivated behavior. The model not only considers im-
balance between cognitive control and reward processing regions but
also includes potential imbalance with avoidance processes centered in
the amygdala and related regions. Ernst proposes that the three regions
act to achieve an equilibrium that “varies across individuals.”
The triadic model rightly expands the brain regions that must be
considered in understanding developmental changes during adoles-
cence. However, although the amygdala has input to the ventral
striatum, it is sensitive to both rewarding and aversive events. Rather
than serving to balance the ventral striatum, it may actually alert the
ventral striatum to salient events that require action (Rolls, 2014). In
their reviews of literature regarding reward processing, Richards et al.
(2013) also note the wide diﬀerences that obtain depending on the
laboratory task and the incentives provided to research participants. In
some paradigms, adolescents exhibit control equal to adults, while in
others they do not. However, even when adolescents appear to engage
in less cognitive control than adults, this deﬁcit can be overcome by
increasing incentives for performance (Richards et al., 2013). In sum,
the model may apply more to individual diﬀerences due either to ex-
perience or tendencies that exist prior to adolescence.
Casey (2015) also suggests that models of adolescent risk taking
include interconnections between more than just the striatum and PFC.
She highlights ﬁndings suggesting that compared to children and young
adults, adolescents exhibit stronger emotional responses to laboratory
stimuli. For example, adolescents commit more errors in a go/no-go
task when the no-go cue is a smiling face compared to a neutral face.
What is less clear is how these responses relate to real world risk taking.
It may be that such responses are related to exploratory behavior,
which is less likely to lead to harmful consequences than high levels of
impulsive behavior. Other examples of emotional responses to emo-
tional stimuli suggested that in some paradigms (but not others), ado-
lescents react more strongly to aversive stimuli, such as fearful faces.
But here again, it is not clear that these responses would lead to
heightened or harmful risk taking, and in some cases, heightened
adolescent response only characterized some adolescents, with others
showing emotional responses comparable to children and adults (Hare
et al., 2008). At this point, without the necessary clarifying information
regarding the type of risk taking that is being examined, it is diﬃcult to
draw conclusions about such evidence.
In summary, our review of the evidence regarding structural dif-
ferences in brain development suggest that the adolescent brain un-
dergoes rapid change during this age period, but connections to mala-
daptive risk behavior depend on both individual diﬀerences and the
type of risk taking. Evidence linking brain structure and function to
risky behavior tends to be inconclusive regarding imbalance, and this is
not surprising given the many ways that risk taking can manifest.
Furthermore, cognitive control reaches maturity by early adulthood
when sensation seeking is in decline but the adverse eﬀects of risk
taking begin to peak. Thus, the developmental imbalance that is sug-
gested to be at the root of such adolescent risk taking is unlikely to
explain this rather late appearance of developmental risk. We propose
instead that for the majority of adolescents, maladaptive risk taking
declines from childhood on. For those with heightened impulsivity,
risks can continue to grow as opportunities for such behavior increase;
however, this pattern is concentrated in a subset of youth who exhibit
impulsive behavior prior to adolescence.
2. Cognitive control vs. experience-based cognitive development
over the lifespan
Imbalance models suggest that cognitive control develops linearly
during adolescence while sensation seeking peaks. Furthermore,
Shulman et al. (2016) claim that cognitive control continues to grow
well into young adulthood and that this helps to explain the continued
rise in risk-taking during this period. Here we note that this presumed
linear increase in cognitive control conﬂates two separate cognitive
processes, one based on structural maturation of the cognitive control
system and the other dependent on increasing connectivity between the
PFC and parietal, occipital, and temporal cortices that build over time
with experience (Fuster, 2009, 2013). When these are separated, it
becomes clear that cognitive control also peaks by late adolescence and
early adulthood while experience-based development continues in a
monotonic fashion well into the aging process.
The distinction between cognitive control and experience-based
cognitive development is consistent with recent research that has
moved beyond simple models of gray matter change to more nuanced
analyses of brain networks (Ernst et al., 2015; Pfeifer and Allen, 2012).
An important study by Dosenbach et al. (2010) examined the devel-
opment of functional brain networks from ages 7 to 30 using resting-
state fMRI. Using a machine-learning approach, they showed that
measures of functional connectivity could provide an index of brain
network maturation that correlates with age. The most important fea-
tures of this model are enhanced connectivity within large-scale func-
tional brain networks, such as the executive control and default mode
networks, but reduced connectivity between such networks during the
adolescent age period (Baum et al., 2017; Stevens, 2016). Interestingly,
analyses indicate an asymptote in functional network development by
age 22, before presumed maturation of pruning and white matter
growth has run its course. However, the dataset was somewhat sparse
in the late adolescent age range, leaving open the possibility that the
asymptote occurred even earlier (e.g., see Vaso et al., 2017). In addi-
tion, similar to the pattern of WM development observed by
Satterthwaite et al. (2013a,b), the range of maturation of brain net-
works during the resting state varied widely across individuals. These
patterns have been subsequently replicated in independent datasets
controlling for confounds due to head movement (Fair et al., 2013;
Satterthwaite et al., 2013b).
Rubia (2013) and Luna et al. (2010) summarize the changes in brain
activation that occur in cortex from childhood to later adulthood. Their
summaries indicate increasing connectivity within cognitive control
networks as children age, which may contribute to greater cognitive
control during adolescence. This conclusion is consistent with recent
studies indicating that brain networks involved in cognitive control
versus default mode become more segregated during adolescence
(Baum et al., 2017; Dosenbach et al., 2010; Fair et al., 2008;
Satterthwaite et al., 2013), but conversely become less segregated
during later adulthood, thereby displaying an inverted-U shaped pattern of
interconnectivity across the lifespan (Betzel et al., 2014; Chan et al.,
2014). Furthermore, Chan et al. (2014) found that reduced network
segregation at any adult age was associated with an important marker
of age-related cognitive decline, namely weaker verbatim memory. As
summarized by Betzel et al. (2014), on the one hand, functional con-
nectivity (FC) over the lifespan within resting state networks (RSNs)
“decreased with age, aﬀecting higher-order control and attention net-
works. On the other hand, FC tended to increase between RSNs, espe-
cially among components of the dorsal attentional network, the sal-
iency/ventral attention networks and visual and attention networks and
the somatomotor network.” (p. 352).
These changes are consistent with a brain that grows in cognitive
ability during adolescence but that increasingly relies on between-
network connections as adulthood progresses into aging. For most
adults, the ability to exert cognitive control or behavioral inhibition
eventually declines as indexed by tasks that challenge response speed
and attentional skills (e.g., stop-signal and WM) (Lindenberger, 2014).
However, older adults have greater ability to draw from experience,
which is consistent with growing connectivity between networks.
2.1. The importance of experience
Despite the stereotype of adolescents as impulsive risk takers, it is
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important to consider the role of exploration and learning that occurs
during this period of development. Fuster (2009, 2013) proposes a
model of brain development across the neocortex involving what he
calls cognits or networks of neuronal connections between the PFC and
other cortical regions that build over time. Cognits provide a bridge
between “executive memory” in the PFC and sensory and “perceptual
memory” in other regions. These memories enable a form of what
Goldberg (2006) calls “executive intelligence” built from experience in
encountering novel problems. These networks are assumed to develop
in a hierarchical manner, such that individual experiences reside at the
lowest level of the network. As experience accumulates, more abstract
levels of memory are formed that enable clearer decision rules for ac-
tion across similar domains. These more abstract memories provide
experienced actors with shortcuts to decision-making that require less
cognitive eﬀort than less experienced adolescents might have to exert.
Fuster’s theory of cognits is also broadly consistent with fuzzy-trace
theory advanced by Reyna and colleagues, who highlight the im-
portance in decision-making of a distributed system of gist in the brain,
as opposed to localized verbatim, memory representations (Reyna et al.,
2015b; see Reyna and Huettel, 2014, for diﬀerences in neural sub-
strates). Fuzzy-trace theory emphasizes the accumulation of experience
that leads to more adult-like decision-making and gist-based intuition
(Reyna and Brainerd, 2011; Wilhelms et al., 2015). As people gain
experience in a decision domain, they begin to understand patterns in
the outcomes that accrue, a process that enables them to rely on more
abstract gist principles regarding those decisions and less on the literal
rewards and costs of a particular decision. This experience encoded in
durable gist memories would be expected to facilitate decision-making
(Fuster, 2009; Goldberg, 2006; Reyna and Lloyd, 2006; Reyna and
Mills, 2014). Although late adolescents and young adults have greater
cognitive control than the average older adult, they may not have de-
veloped the insight from experience, or what is conventionally called
wisdom, that is important for functioning in the world (Reyna et al.,
2011). Such experience would convert many ambiguous risk situations
to ones with known risks that elicit less risk taking with age.
Research on cognition has shown that people mentally represent
information about decision options in two ways: verbatim representa-
tions of details, which are precise enough to support analytical
thinking, and gist representations, which are less detailed (i.e., fuzzy)
and support impressionistic, parallel, and typically unconscious
thinking (similar to characterizations of intuition; Reyna, 2012). The
preference to rely on gist grows with experience, and, for risk and
probability, the simplest gist is categorical, for example, the categorical
distinction between some risk or no risk (e.g., Reyna et al., 2014; Reyna
and Ellis, 1994). As adolescents age, it would be expected that they
would also increasingly rely on gist-based reasoning when confronted
with potentially maladaptive risk taking. The growth of reliance on
more abstract gist memories from childhood to adulthood, as predicted
by fuzzy-trace theory, has been replicated in 53 out of 55 studies on
gist-based “false” memories (Reyna, 2011).
Consistent with a monotonic decline in risk taking with un-
ambiguous risks, there is evidence that adolescents with better execu-
tive function perform better on such tasks (Brand et al., 2006; Khurana
et al., 2015a; Shamosh et al., 2008). This evidence suggests that the
decline that occurs with development can be attributed in part to in-
creasing ability to store and compare outcomes of risky decisions. Such
ability would also lead to better integration of experience when con-
fronting risky situations, including reliance on gist-based memories. As
a result, preference for maladaptive risk taking in speciﬁc domains
would be expected to decline as experience accumulates and to do so
more rapidly for youth with better executive function.
The meta-analysis by Defoe et al. (2014) (see also Tymula et al.,
2012) contrasted the predictions of fuzzy-trace theory versus imbalance
theories in laboratory tests of risk taking. The ﬁnding that risk taking
declines with age, especially when a certain option is available, is not
anticipated by imbalance theories. The presence of a certain versus
risky option provides a critical test of contrasting theoretical predic-
tions (e.g., see Kühberger and Tanner, 2010). Fuzzy-trace theory pre-
dicts that a gist representation favors the selection of the certain option
for gains, a preference that grows with experience. Experiments on the
development of risk taking conﬁrmed that, in addition to motivational
and cognitive control factors, risk preference is a function of competing
verbatim versus gist mental representations of decision options. From
the perspective of gist-based intuition, risking HIV infection by having
unprotected sex is a bad idea even if the risks are low and the beneﬁts
are high (see Reyna, 2008). These theoretical ideas explain the other-
wise puzzling (but predicted and replicated) result that experience,
both from childhood to adulthood and from novice to expert in a spe-
ciﬁc domain of decision making, is associated with greater reliance on
gist-based intuition rather than verbatim reasoning (e.g., Reyna et al.,
2011; Reyna and Lloyd, 2006).
The greater verbatim information-processing eﬃciency of adoles-
cents (relative to children and aging adults) would appear to be a
beneﬁt that compensates for their lack of experience. Adults progres-
sively lose the ability to exert cognitive control over their attention and
WM capacities (Lindenberger, 2014), leading to what Goldberg (2006)
has termed “The Wisdom Paradox.” With aging, the neocortex con-
tinues to lose gray matter in PFC with associated reductions in the
ability to remember verbatim details of past experience and to hold
information in WM (Chan et al., 2014; Dennis et al., 2013). Adults
experience a domain-general decline in verbatim cognitive skills
starting in the third decade of life (Tucker-Drob, 2011; Lachman et al.,
2014), although gist memory is conserved (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2009;
Reyna, 2012). During the same period of verbatim decline, the brain is
estimated to lose about 7% of its striatal dopamine transporters per
decade (Volkow et al., 1996), with even larger declines in the PFC
(Eppinger et al., 2011). These declines, which begin in the third decade
of life, are associated with reductions in various cognitive and motor
functions, including episodic and working memory, inhibitory control,
and switching (Bäckman et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010; Volkow et al.,
1998). Yet, consistent with conservation of gist-based intuition, older
adults’ risky decision-making remains largely indistinguishable from
that of younger adults when verbatim memory is not required (Mata
et al., 2011; Samanez-Larkin and Knutson, 2014). Although adults are
able to make good, and perhaps even better decisions than adolescents,
they rely on their accumulated experience to counterbalance the de-
clines in executive function that they once possessed in late adolescence
and early adulthood.
From the perspective presented here, experience making risky de-
cisions during adolescence, as executive functions develop, fosters in-
creased development of gist-based reasoning. This experience is espe-
cially critical because it allows adults to avoid unhealthy risks using
cognitive capacities (i.e., gist memory) that are preserved over a life-
time and that are robust in stressful or emotional situations (e.g., Reyna
and Brainerd, 2011; see Reyna, 2011, for estimates of verbatim and gist
memory, as well as cognitive control, across the lifespan). The growth
in this ability reﬂects increasing wisdom, deﬁned as the accumulation
of gist-based insight and expert knowledge about the conduct and
management of life challenges (Baltes and Smith, 2008; Baltes and
Staudinger, 2000; Sternberg, 2001).
From a neurodevelopmental perspective, wisdom most likely in-
volves the maturation (including pruning) and interconnection of sev-
eral brain regions that enable the individual to harness experience in an
adaptive fashion (Meeks and Jeste, 2009; Reyna and Huettel, 2014).
These include the executive control and limbic systems. The default
mode network including medial PFC plays an important role by facil-
itating self-referential processing, empathy, theory of mind, and future
projection (Buckner et al., 2008; Meeks and Jeste, 2009). As noted, this
system exhibits increasing intra-connectivity during adolescence (Fair
et al., 2008; Sherman et al., 2014; Supekar et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it
is the integrated functionality between systems across development that
distinguishes wisdom from a simple top-down impulse control system
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(Reyna et al., 2015b).
We summarize the changes that occur relevant to adaptive decision
making over the lifespan in Fig. 6. This model diﬀers from imbalance
models in several respects but most importantly by including a third
trajectory representing the accumulation of experience and hence
wisdom. Executive function displays an inverted U-shape function that
peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood (Lachman et al., 2014;
Lindenberger, 2014; Williams et al., 1999). At the same time as ex-
ecutive function is improving during adolescence, the rise in sensation
seeking and related dopamine expression drives exploration of the en-
vironment which peaks earlier than executive function but subsides
during later years (Mata et al., 2016). However, as we describe below,
as a result of these two processes, the brain builds networks of ex-
perience that foster greater ability to make adaptive decisions in later
adulthood despite the decline in executive function (Richards and
Hatch, 2011; Webster et al., 2013). Thus, the rise in exploration that
characterizes the adolescent brain serves an adaptive purpose of
building robust representations of experience.
The model also recognizes that the late adolescent and young adult
brain is still a work in progress during the period when exploration and
wisdom are growing despite having reached the peak in cognitive
control. Thus, late adolescents and young adults will still be exploring
their world during this period and taking risks many of which can be
adaptive. For those with especially weak cognitive control however,
this period may produce particularly unhealthy consequences, such as
addiction and unintentional injuries, many of which were fore-
shadowed by earlier impulsive behavior.
2.2. The adaptive adolescent brain
Although heightened sensation seeking makes novel and potentially
risky behavior more common during adolescence, this risk taking may
be motivated by a “rational calculus” (Reyna and Farley, 2006) that
may be adaptive for learning that underlies brain maturation (see also
Ellis et al., 2012; Luciana, 2016; Telzer, 2015). A study by Cohen et al.
(2010) illustrates the adaptive character of the adolescent brain. In this
study, adolescent participants (ages 14–19) showed a stronger dopa-
minergic brain response to reward prediction errors when engaging in a
learning task than either younger children (ages 8–12) or adults (ages
25–30) (see also Galván et al., 2006, discussed above). Prediction error
is considered important in motivating learning (Pagnoni et al., 2002;
Schultz et al., 1997) and suggests that adolescents can take advantage
of such error feedback as they explore the environment. Although the
authors interpreted the ﬁnding as consistent with the hypothesis that
adolescents engage in riskier behavior than younger or older persons,
the task did not involve risky decision-making and thus was also con-
sistent with the conclusion that adolescents are disproportionately
primed to take advantage of positive feedback in a learning situation
(see also Davidow et al., 2016; Satterthwaite et al., 2012).
Murty et al. (2016) recently proposed a model of experience-based
brain development termed the Experience-Driven Adaptive Cognitive
Model of adolescence that highlights the role of dopamine activation
during adolescence as a modulator of enhanced memory-circuit in-
tegration between the hippocampus (HPC) and PFC. They review evi-
dence indicating the importance of this process for building long-term
memory representations that enable the use of experience to further
more adaptive decision making. In particular, abundant evidence from
studies in animals suggests that dopamine release from neurons in the
midbrain plays an important role in the coding of reward prediction
errors and uncertainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). In
humans, such signals play an important role in episodic memory for-
mation (Shohamy and Adcock, 2010), and tonic levels of midbrain
dopamine activation may encourage exploration and acquisition of
long-term memories that support learning and adaptation (Düzel et al.,
2010). As Murty et al. (2016) say, “…diﬀerent lines of research provide
compelling support for adolescence being a unique period of plasticity
and reﬁnement of HPC-PFC circuits for the establishment of con-
textually-relevant responses to guide and optimize goal-oriented be-
haviors.” (p. 54). Their model is consistent with the suggestion that the
exploratory behavior motivated by dopaminergic activation during
adolescence serves adaptive purposes.
A study of adolescent decision-making in the presence of reward
reversal also supports the adaptive character of the adolescent brain.
When confronted with changing reward contingencies, adolescents
exhibited heightened activation of insular cortex, which was associated
with more rapid reversal learning (Hauser et al., 2015). Young adults
were slower to respond to the changes in contingencies. Recognizing
such changes in contingencies is evidence of engaged executive func-
tion. These results suggest a possible mitigating factor (that adolescent
brains are quick to recognize changes in reward contingencies), oﬀ-
setting to some degree their heightened sensation seeking or attraction
to novel experience.
Interestingly, youth with higher sensation seeking exhibit less im-
pulsive choice as they age. In a national sample of adolescents and
Fig. 6. Hypothesized trajectories of the Life Span
Wisdom Model of cognitive control, exploration, and
experience. Y axis scale is arbitrary.
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young adults, Romer et al. (2010) found that high sensation seekers,
who were more likely to engage in risky behavior than low sensation
seekers, also exhibited higher levels of the ability to delay gratiﬁcation
as they aged, an important indicator of reduced impulsivity and cog-
nitive control (Casey et al., 2011). Indeed, they reached higher levels of
patience than youth who were lower in sensation seeking. Thus, ex-
perience gained during risk taking can lead to more adaptive decision-
making over the long term, especially among those with suﬃcient
cognitive skills, such as WM, to integrate their experience for future
behavior.
Risk taking during adolescence has been described as normative.
For example, Baumrind (1987) argued that “risk taking behavior
characterizes normal adolescent development.” (p. 98) Furthermore,
“…some experimentation – be it with drugs or sex or odd diets or new
ideas – is typical, and may even be an essential component, of a
healthful adolescent experience and contribute to optimal compe-
tence.” (p. 98) Some studies have shown that adolescents who experi-
mented with drugs were more socially accepted by peers (Lightfoot,
1997; Maggs et al., 1995) and exhibited better adjustment than those
who completely abstained from drug use (Shedler and Block, 1990).
Chassin et al. (1989) observed that youth higher in sensation seeking
engaged in what they called “constructive” risk taking, characterized by
desire for independence and academic success, whereas “destructive”
risk takers were characterized by impulsivity and antisocial tendencies.
In a longitudinal study across grades 5–10, Lewis-Bizan et al. (2010)
observed that youth who were characterized as possessing positive
developmental attributes, such as competent control over behavior,
were also likely to engage in risky behavior. However, their risk taking
did not continue at high levels later in adolescence.
In some statements of imbalance models (e.g., Casey and Caudle,
2013; Spear, 2013), the importance of individual diﬀerences in ado-
lescent risk taking is acknowledged. Nevertheless, the lower ability of
the adolescent to control socioemotional decisions continues to be cited
as a common deﬁcit in adolescent brain function. For example, studies
using driving simulation tasks by Steinberg and colleagues (e.g., Chein
et al., 2011) are interpreted to show that adolescents’ brains respond
impulsively to the presence of their peers (Steinberg, 2014), whereas
adults are less susceptible to these inﬂuences. Although peer eﬀects
may be stronger in adolescents, the direction of such eﬀects appears to
depend on the characteristics of those peers. Simply placing adolescents
behind the wheel with peers in the vehicle does not necessarily produce
riskier driving (see Romer et al., 2014, for a review). In particular,
greater risk taking in the presence of peers is consistent with a group
polarization eﬀect of peer inﬂuence, such that when drivers think peer
passengers expect them to drive aggressively, they are more likely to do
so. However, when peers are not expected to hold these preferences,
adolescent drivers are no more likely to drive in a risky manner
(Bingham et al., 2016; Simons-Morton et al., 2014).
It is likely therefore that youth with relatively good executive
control and peer groups with similar characteristics will be able to
experiment with risky behavior without advancing to more serious
outcomes (Lightfoot, 1997). However, as our analysis suggests, some
youth will experience premature pregnancy, substance use, and other
maladaptive behaviors that adversely aﬀect educational attainment,
health, and other social outcomes (Institute of Medicine, 2011).
3. Beyond imbalance during adolescence
Despite the valuable insights spurred by imbalance models, it time
to move beyond these models to consider the role that experience plays
in healthy adolescent development. One potentially fruitful direction in
future research would be to compare measures of gist learning and
decision making to measures that capture the development of wisdom
(Sunstein, 2008; see also, Reyna, 2008; Reyna and Huettel, 2014). Such
a direct comparison would test Reyna and Brainerd’s (2011) fuzzy-trace
theory, which predicts that decision-making shifts from relying on
lower-level (verbatim) representations that encourage risk taking to
more abstract (gist) representations that support healthier decisions to
categorically avoid catastrophic risks (but to take risks when they oﬀer
the possibility of a categorically superior outcome relative to less risky
options). In this regard, the theory has already successfully predicted
self-reported real-world risky behaviors using gist measures (e.g.,
Broniatowski et al., 2015; Fraenkel et al., 2012; Mills et al., 2008;
Reyna et al., 2011; Reyna and Mills, 2014; Wolfe et al., 2015).
Another promising direction for future research is to examine the
relation between executive functions such as WM and the decline in
maladaptive risk taking with age. As the consequences of exploratory
risk taking accumulate in experience, those with stronger WM should be
able to incorporate those experiences more eﬀectively in decisions en-
tailing maladaptive risk. Preliminary evidence for this prediction has
been observed in a study of late adolescent risk for drug addiction.
Those with stronger WM ability were more able to avoid advancing to
drug dependence apart from diﬀerences in impulsive tendencies
(Khurana et al., 2017).
Our model also suggests that we look at risk taking more broadly
than just examining behaviors with adverse consequences. For example,
Romer et al. (2016) showed that both sensation seeking and parts of the
BAS were related to risk behaviors that are considered adaptive, such as
entering scholastic competitions and engaging in sports (see also
Hansen and Breivik, 2001). Many of the risky behaviors that adoles-
cents pursue involve potential social conﬂicts with parents or peers
(Weber et al., 2002), and these and other forms of risk behavior are also
likely to increase during adolescence and should be considered in our
models.
We have said little about sex diﬀerences, but as is evident in Fig. 2,
there are gender diﬀerences in sensation seeking (Cross et al., 2011),
which will have implications for diﬀerent types of risk taking during
adolescence. The correlation between sensation seeking and impulsive
action is consistent with a smaller but established sex diﬀerence in
measures of impulsive action (Cross et al., 2011), corresponding to the
risk insensitive trajectory in our model in Fig. 5. This trajectory helps to
explain the well-established over-representation of males in ex-
ternalizing behavior, a pattern that begins early in development among
youth with weak cognitive control (Bjork and Pardini, 2015; McGue
and Iacono, 2005; Moﬃtt et al., 2011). On the other hand, the small
relation between sensation seeking and decisions under known risk is
consistent with the lack of sex diﬀerences in decisions under known risk
(Cross et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the diﬀerences in sensation seeking
would suggest that females are less inclined to engage in exploratory
risk taking. However, many of the rewarding aspects of such behaviors
are likely to be domain speciﬁc, such that young women may engage in
exploration if they perceive the rewards to be suﬃciently strong
(Romer and Hennessy, 2007; Santos et al., 2016), for example in social
domains (Weber et al., 2002). Future research should examine this
possibility as well.
Finally, much remains to be learned about the organization of RSNs
during the transition to adulthood. It is already known that youth with
ADHD have weaker ability to suppress the default mode network
(DMN) than normally developing youth (Kessler et al., 2016; Posner
et al., 2014). This is evident in stronger connectivity between the DMN
and task-positive networks in youth with ADHD. Youth with ex-
ternalizing disorder and elevated levels of impulsive action exhibit the
same pattern (Inuggi et al., 2014; Kessler et al., 2014; Shannon et al.,
2011). Future research could identify the neural basis of this deﬁcit and
explore potential interventions that could reduce it (Kelly and
Castellanos, 2014; Stevens, 2016). These leads could be followed to
determine the neural basis of harmful forms of impulsivity as opposed
to exploratory forms of risk taking that emerge during adolescence.
Research regarding the functional roles of RSNs as they respond to
growth in experience and wisdom during the adolescent period would
appear to be a fruitful avenue of future research.
As more is learned about the growth of wisdom over the lifespan, it
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is also important not to overplay the wisdom of adulthood. Just as
stereotypes regarding adolescence have colored our interpretation of
brain research, it is just as easy to romanticize the experience and
wisdom of adulthood. Research shows that relying on gist can lead to
predictable biases even in experts (see Wilhelms et al., 2015). The in-
creasing aversion to risk in ambiguous contexts may also lead to less
than optimal search tendencies (Tymula et al., 2012). A good deal of
research in decision making over the past several decades reveals how
heuristics and biases common in adults can produce fallacies in judg-
ment (Kahneman, 2013; Stanovich, 2011). This classic research serves
as the foundation of more recent approaches, such as fuzzy-trace
theory, that account for fallacies in adulthood but also explain the
strengths of mature decision making (Defoe et al., 2014; Reyna et al.,
2014).
In conclusion, we have presented an alternative model of adolescent
brain development that emphasizes the accumulation of experience as
adolescents age and transition to adulthood, with concomitant changes
in judgment and decision making (see Table 1 for a summary of dif-
ferences between the Life-span Wisdom Model and Imbalance Models).
The model explains much of the apparent increase in adolescent risk
taking as an adaptive need to gain the experience required to assume
adult roles and behaviors. The risk-taking that reﬂects lack of control or
excessive sensitivity to immediate rewards is primarily an individual
diﬀerence that characterizes some persons from an early age that can
persist well into adulthood. At the same time, the adolescent brain is
supremely sensitive to the learning that can occur during this period
and has cognitive capacities to take advantage of the experience gained.
The result is a brain with integrated circuits encompassing executive
function (i.e., cognitive control and inhibition), as well as verbatim and
gist memory networks, which can be called upon to negotiate both
novel and familiar situations. The preservation of robust gist thinking
maintains wise decision making during later adulthood when cognitive
control capacities diminish. We believe this approach is more aligned
with the scientiﬁc evidence, including results that challenge stereotypes
about the adolescent brain.
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